










Introduction: Montgomery and Therapeutic Privilege

The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board​[1]​ (‘Montgomery’) is one of the most important Tort cases of this decade. By dint of comparative legal reasoning — principally by reference to the High Court of Australia decision in Rogers v Whitaker​[2]​ — it managed to clarify (and partly overrule) possibly the most confusing and unsatisfactory House of Lords decision in recent history, Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital​[3]​ (‘Sidaway’). In modern English law, when asking the question, what risks should a doctor disclose to a patient, prior to the treatment or procedure being undertaken? — the answer now is: those risks which a ‘reasonable patient’, or one with that particular patient’s subjective concerns, would regard as being material.

	However, the obverse question — i.e., what risks is a doctor entitled to withhold from a patient, prior to that treatment or procedure? — has not benefitted from nearly the same degree of clarification in Montgomery. Indeed, the defence of ‘therapeutic privilege’ remains as unsettled and obscure as it has ever been in English jurisprudence. For a defence which is not partial, but complete (and hence, of immense potential value to doctors and to their insurers), it is unfortunate that neither patients nor their medical advisers are much the wiser as to elements, or the scope, of that defence. What is clear, at least, is that the UK Supreme Court has endorsed its ongoing legal recognition (albeit that it was unavailable on those facts​[4]​).

	The challenge undertaken in this article is to propose some workable version of the defence – and if none is acceptable to the English judiciary, then the defence should be abolished altogether. 

	As a working definition, ‘therapeutic privilege’​[5]​ excuses a doctor or other healthcare practitioner, D, from complying with his legal obligations to disclose to a patient, C, the material risks associated with medical treatment, where it is reasonably considered that such disclosure would seriously harm the patient. In Montgomery, Lords Kerr and Reed cited the defence in these terms: ‘[t]he doctor is ... entitled to withhold from the patient information as to a risk if he reasonably considers that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient's health.’​[6]​

	For the purposes of this article, comparative insights about the defence will be drawn from medico-legal jurisprudence emanating from the United States and Australia. The reasons for selecting those particular jurisdictions (over and above others in which the defence has at least been recognised, if not applied​[7]​) are two-fold. Respectively: the United States, as the ‘home’ of the defence, has had the longest opportunity to evaluate its scope; whilst Australian jurisprudence is particularly relevant for English law, post-Montgomery, given the explicit adoption of the Rogers v Whitaker​[8]​ test of disclosure by the UK Supreme Court.

	The position put in this article is that it does little for the clarity of Tort jurisprudence, if a complete defence to an allegation of negligence is a defence ‘in name only’. Some improvement in this area is desperately required, for the sake of medical practitioners, and for those who advise them. 

The Comparator Jurisdictions: A Snapshot

Origins of the Defence in United States Jurisprudence 

In Sidaway, Lord Scarman noted that the defence of therapeutic privilege originated in United States (US) medico-legal jurisprudence,​[9]​ specifically by reference to Canterbury v Spence (1972): ‘when risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view .... the cases have generally held that the physician is armed with a privilege to keep the information from the patient’.​[10]​ The American origins of the doctrine (sourced to Canterbury v Spence) have been cited at the highest appellate level in Australia​[11]​ and Canada​[12]​ too. 

	It is somewhat ironic that Canterbury has been accorded such prominence in the development of therapeutic privilege, when (as judicially noted since​[13]​) any discussion of the defence therein was dicta only. It did not apply. Mr Canterbury suffered from urinary incontinence and bowel paralysis as a result of a laminectomy which was performed when he was a young boy, and his treating doctor, Dr Spence, was held to have breached his duty, by not revealing that 1% risk of paralysis (the case was remanded for a new trial on, inter alia, causation). There was no finding, however, that Dr Spence was ‘armed with a privilege’ to keep the information about paralysis from Mr Canterbury. Quite the reverse.
 
	Moreover, Canterbury was not the first US case to acknowledge the existence of this doctor’s defence.  For example, in Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr University Board of Trustees (1957), the California District Court of Appeal noted that a doctor ‘must place the welfare of his patient above all else’, which may require him to ‘recognize that ... the patient’s mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk, a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.’​[14]​ A few years later, in Natanson v Kline (1960), the Supreme Court of Kansas remarked that, ‘[t]here is probably a privilege, on therapeutic grounds, to withhold the specific diagnosis where the disclosure of cancer or some other dread disease would seriously jeopardize the recovery of an unstable, temperamental or severely depressed patient.’​[15]​

	Indeed, the decision in Canterbury in somewhat overshadowed by the successful application of the defence in Nishi v Hartwell (1970).​[16]​ Dr Frances Nishi, a dentist in Honolulu, underwent x-rays which showed that he might be suffering from an aneurysm. He was referred to a cardiovascular surgeon, Dr Hartwell, and another specialist, in Houston, Texas, for further medical procedures. Dr Nishi was tragically paralysed from the waist down, after being injected with a contrast dye which was used during an x-ray of his thoracic aorta. Dr Hartwell gave evidence that to tell Dr Nishi about the potential side-effect of paralysis ‘would have been a terrible mistake’. This was allegedly because Dr Nishi was in severe pain, frightened and apprehensive about his condition, he had serious heart disease and hypertension, plus chronic kidney disease, and in the light of all of that, disclosure was not in his best interests. The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that failing to disclose the risk of paralysis was ‘clearly within the exception to the duty of full disclosure which excuses the withholding of information for therapeutic reasons.’​[17]​ 

	However, even in the US, the defence is still viewed with some circumspection, and successful examples of it are very hard to find. As some commentary has recently noted, it ‘allow[s] patients to reject information as well as to receive it’;​[18]​ but others have counselled against it, calling it ‘extremely controversial and largely disfavoured’,​[19]​ and that it ‘nullifies the general obligations of disclosure and respect for patient autonomy and self-determination and should therefore be discouraged’.​[20]​  Judicially too, reservations exist. For example, it was stated recently, in Stuart v Loomis (2014), that doctors ‘should withhold information only in rare circumstances and with great caution’, and that the defence had ‘its limits’.​[21]​ In Canterbury itself, the US Appeals Court for the District of Columbia put it memorably — construe the defence too widely, and it ‘might devour the disclosure rule itself’.​[22]​

The Direct Relevance of Australian Jurisprudence





Rogers v Whitaker (1992):	Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015):
Patient Maree Whitaker, C, underwent eye surgery on her ‘bad eye’, in which she had lost sight as a child. C was not advised by her ophthalmic surgeon, Dr Rogers, D, of the risk of ‘sympathetic ophthalmia’, a rare condition in which a ‘good organ’ may turn in sympathy with the injured organ. This condition manifested, shortly after unsuccessful surgery. C was rendered blind. A duty to disclose that rare risk was upheld. The defence of therapeutic privilege was mentioned in passing only, but not applied. 	Patient Nadine Montgomery, C, was not advised by her treating obstetrician and gynaecologist, Dr McLellan, D, of the risks of shoulder dystocia (to both her and the baby) if her baby was delivered naturally, risks which were heightened due to C’s small stature and diabetes. C’s baby suffered serious physical and mental injuries. A duty to disclose the risks, and to advise of the possibility of delivery by Caesarian section, was upheld. Any application of the defence of therapeutic privilege was expressly rejected. 
What they said about when a risk should be disclosed to a patient — the ‘primary duty’: 
The law should recognise that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case:	The doctor is ... under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case:
The so-called objective, or ‘proactive’, duty: 
 a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it, or	a reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or 
The so-called subjective, or ‘reactive’, duty: 
 the medical practitioner is, or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it. 	 the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.
What they said about therapeutic privilege: 
The majority: This duty is subject to the therapeutic privilege. ... [and] Except in those cases where there is a particular danger that the provision of all relevant information will harm an unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile patient, no special medical skill is involved in disclosing the information [about risks].Gaudron J: I see no basis for any exception or "therapeutic privilege" which is not based in medical emergency or in considerations of the patient's ability to receive, understand or properly evaluate the significance of the [risks] information that would ordinarily be required.	Unanimously: That is not to say that the doctor is required to make disclosures to her patient if, in the reasonable exercise of medical judgment, she considers that it would be detrimental to the health of her patient to do so; but ... it is important that the therapeutic exception should not be abused. It is a limited exception to the general principle that the patient should make the decision whether to undergo a proposed course of treatment: it is not intended to subvert that principle by enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making an informed choice where she is liable to make a choice which the doctor considers to be contrary to her best interests.

The defence of therapeutic privilege continues to be alluded to in Australia,​[25]​ post-Rogers v Whitaker — although the author’s searches have been unable to elicit any successful plea of the defence since. 

	Note, from the fact description in the Table, that Mrs Montgomery was said to be ‘becoming anxious’ about her ability to deliver her baby naturally, given what the ultrasound at 36 weeks had shown about the baby’s size and growth; whilst Mrs Whitaker was said to be extremely anxious (of ‘great concern’) that nothing should happen to her one good eye. Although the defence of therapeutic privilege was mentioned and endorsed in dicta by both appellate courts, it certainly did not succeed for either Dr McLellan or Dr Rogers, respectively.

	Australian law also illustrates that there are other ‘escape hatches’ for D in failure-to-disclose suits, reducing the need to rely on any such defence. For example, on the question of duty of care, the risk may not have been material or significant, so there was no duty to disclose it. On the question of breach, there may be a dispute about credibility — the evidence of the doctor, that ‘I would have disclosed the risk, because I always do’, versus the patient’s claim that, on this occasion, it was not disclosed — and the doctor may succeed on that question. That conundrum occurred in Monument v Baker.​[26]​ The operation occurred 10 years prior to the trial. Memories obviously fade with time, and recollection of the details become blurred. The defendant surgeon gave evidence that he provided a general warning about potential damage to the patient’s accessory nerve arising from the proposed surgery, whereas Mr Monument denied that he’d been given any relevant warning. The District Court concluded that, ‘[o]n the balance of probabilities, it is likely that Mr Baker gave to Mr Monument a warning in the terms that Mr Baker has described in his evidence. He is an experienced surgeon and he stated that the giving of such a warning was his usual practice’.​[27]​ Furthermore, regarding causation, it may be that, even if the risk had been disclosed by the doctor, the patient would have proceeded with the operation or procedure in any event, thereby precluding any causal connection between the failure to warn and the injury which occurred. This was the result in Odisho v Bonazzi,​[28]​ a recent decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal. Miss Odisho presented as ‘a particularly anxious patient’,​[29]​ but the Court held that she would have accepted the treatment of tranexamic acid, even had she been warned of the very slight risk of thromboembolism which was a side effect of that treatment. Finally, a material risk may not have manifested, but it was another risk altogether which manifested and damaged the patient, thereby raising problems as to whether the injury was too remote at law.​[30]​ 

	We turn now to the question of immediate importance — the extent to which the defence has been endorsed, or applied, in English jurisprudence.





The defence of therapeutic privilege has been approved at the highest appellate levels in England, and frequently alluded to by inferior courts — although confusingly in some cases, not by that name.

	In Sidaway, Lord Scarman remarked that risks information can be withheld, if ‘a reasonable medical assessment of the patient would have indicated to the doctor that disclosure would have posed a serious threat of psychological detriment to the patient’,​[31]​ while Lord Templeman noted that the duty to disclose was ‘subject always to the doctor’s own obligation to say and do nothing which the doctor is satisfied will be harmful to the patient’.​[32]​ Lord Steyn also opined, in Chester v Afshar, that ‘there may be wholly exceptional cases where, objectively in the best interests of the patient, the surgeon may be excused from giving a warning’.​[33]​ Both cases concerned the manifestation of a risk associated with back surgery. In neither case was the relevant warning given. Miss Chester, in particular, was described as being ‘anxious to avoid surgery if possible’,​[34]​and the trial judge had referred to her worried personality (‘it is often a difficult and delicate matter for a consultant to advise a patient about what he regards as comparatively minor risks, particularly when that patient is already suffering from stress, pain and anxiety. He will naturally be anxious to avoid alarming or confusing the patient unnecessarily ... It may well be that he considered [Miss Chester] over-anxious or over-preoccupied with “horror stories” and the possibility of being crippled. In these circumstances I do not find it improbable that, in an attempt to reassure, he deflected her inquiries by answering them in light-hearted terms’​[35]​). However, in neither Chester nor Sidaway was the defence successful.

	Some cases at first instance have notionally considered the defence. In dicta, the following cases held that risks disclosure may be withheld: where disclosure would be ‘medically damaging to the patient’ (per Deriche v Ealing Hospital NHS Trust,​[36]​ but the prospect of risks disclosure undermining the patient’s confidence in continuing with her pregnancy, following exposure to chicken pox, was not enough to fit that description); where ‘it can be shown that a reasonable medical assessment of the patient would have indicated to the doctor that disclosure would have posed a serious threat of psychological detriment to the patient’ (per Smith v Eastern Health and Social Services Board,​[37]​ where there was no duty to disclose the risk of genito-femoral nerve irritation, as it was not a significant risk); where ‘a doctor may be genuinely and reasonably so convinced that a particular operation is in the patient’s best interests that he is justified in being somewhat economical with the truth where recital of the dangers is concerned’ (per McAllister v Lewisham and North Southwark HA,​[38]​ although Rougier J’s statement did not apply to this patient, who underwent lengthy brain surgery and was not warned of the risk of hemiplegia, and who succeeded in her claim); and where the risks information may have ‘deter[red] the parents from consenting to the operation, which those experts strongly believed to be in the best interests of Matthew, [then] I think it is arguable that they were entitled to withhold that information’ (per Poynter v Hillingdon HA,​[39]​ although ultimately, the 1% risk of brain damage did not need to be disclosed here, as it was not significant enough). 

	At Court of Appeal level, the defence has also arisen in dicta. In Wyatt v Curtis,​[40]​ Miss Wyatt, 18, claimed that the risks of her having chickenpox whilst pregnant, including permanent brain damage to her unborn child, were not adequately explained by two doctors: ‘[a]ny doctor ... would be bound to place in the balance the potential emotional distress that might be caused to the patient by reopening a question over which it was likely that she would have agonised in making her difficult decision following the initial advice’ (adequate risks information was ultimately held to be provided to Miss Wyatt). In Thake v Maurice,​[41]​ the Court also conceded that withholding risks information was justifiable if it ‘might have caused worry or concern to the [patients]’; whilst more recently, in Chinnock (Schumann) v Veale Wasbrough, Jackson LJ noted that, post-Montgomery, the primary duty of disclosure is ‘[s]ubject to the therapeutic exception’.​[42]​





The author’s searches have not elicited a single case in which therapeutic privilege has been expressly attributed in the judgment as the reason for the doctor’s success in fending off a failure-to-warn claim. However one reason for the defence's obscurity is that, occasionally, it has been successful for a doctor — but without any judicial explanation of the elements, the scope, or even the name of the defence being apparent. 

	In Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,​[43]​ the defendant obstetrician did not warn Mrs Pearce, an expectant mother, of the increased risk of stillbirth if delivery were delayed, and if there was no medical intervention such as induction or a Caesarian section. Rather, he suggested that they should ‘let nature take its course’. The baby, named Jacqueline, died in utero during the intervening period, and was delivered stillborn. A reasonable body of medical opinion did not consider that the 0.1–0.2% risk of stillbirth ought to have been disclosed. Lord Woolf MR concluded that the risk did not need disclosing, for two reasons. First, the risk was adjudged to be insignificant in legal terms. Secondly — and more importantly for present purposes — Lord Woolf decided that: ‘[p]articularly when one bears in mind Mrs Pearce’s distressed condition, one cannot criticise Mr Niven’s decision not to inform Mrs Pearce of that very, very small additional risk [of stillbirth]’.​[44]​ The obstetrician was entitled to take account of the effect that disclosure might have on ‘the state of the patient at the particular time, both from the physical point of view and an emotional point of view.’​[45]​ This is a clear application of therapeutic privilege, although not by that name. 

General Medical Council (GMC) Guidance

The GMC’s Guidance, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together,​[46]​ also alludes to the defence of therapeutic privilege, by stating: 

[16] You should not withhold information necessary for making decisions for any other reason ... unless you believe that giving it would cause the patient serious harm. In this context ‘serious harm’ means more than that the patient might become upset or decide to refuse treatment.[17] If you withhold information from the patient you must record your reason for doing so in the patient’s medical records, and you must be prepared to explain and justify your decision. You should regularly review your decision, and consider whether you could give information to the patient later, without causing them serious harm.

We will return to these provisions later in the article, particularly to suggest how some aspects may be worth a redraft, in light of Montgomery and other decisions reviewed in this article. 

The Elements of the Therapeutic Privilege Defence

For the defence of therapeutic privilege to derive any greater recognition in English law, its elements will need to be far better articulated. As mentioned in another context in Tort altogether,​[47]​ labels being ‘bandied about’ is no substitute for a descent into legal and factual detail. Neither the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery nor the Australian High Court in Rogers v Whitaker set out those elements. This is perhaps understandable, given neither defendant could realistically have been confronted with the defence on the respective facts. However, the lack of articulation of the elements which underpin the defence (even in the United States) has undoubtedly hindered its application. Neither medical practitioners nor their legal advisers have much firm judicial guidance as to when the defence will apply. This ‘gap’ has also rendered the theoretical basis of the defence difficult to ascertain (i.e., is it a doctrine which precludes a duty of care from arising altogether, or is it a true defence which rebuts a patient’s complete cause of action?​[48]​). 

	In response to these conundrums, this section of the article seeks to tease out the defence’s likely three elements, by reference to comparative case law analysis drawn from English, US, and Australian jurisprudence.

Element #1: Risks Disclosure to the Patient Would Foreseeably be Adverse or Damaging

This element has two limbs: proving both a de minimis level of damage, and a reasonable foreseeability of harm. Dealing with each in turn: 

A de minimis level of damage. In Sidaway, Lord Scarman referred to the prospect of a ‘serious threat’ to the patient’s health, whilst the Montgomery Supreme Court held that the defence applied where risks disclosure would be ‘seriously detrimental to the patient’s health’. However, there is no suggestion, from either judgment, that the patient’s harm must reach the threshold of a recognised psychiatric injury (as contained in the classifications of DSM-V or ICD-10). Indeed, in Pearce v United Bristol,​[49]​ Lord Woolf MR referred to the patient’s ‘emotional point of view’, which could cover a myriad of normal human reactions to ‘bad news’, from distress and despondency to anger, irritation, fear, anger, etc. 

	A de minimis requirement for some ‘serious harm’ has been reflected in the comparator jurisdictions too, wherein it has been emphasised that a trivial effect upon the patient’s health, should the risks be disclosed, could never justify the application of the defence. For example, the US Supreme Court noted, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, that the defence applies where the doctor ‘reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient’.​[50]​ Earlier, in F v R, the South Australian Supreme Court also stated that the defence applies where the patient’s ‘health ... might be seriously harmed’ by the disclosure.

	This is an important threshold requirement, upon which England and the two comparator jurisdictions are in total agreement. 

Probability, or reasonable foreseeability? Of course, the doctor is operating in the realms of the hypothetical, when assessing whether to disclose a material risk to a patient. He must evaluate, during a short consultation in a busy day of appointments, the patient’s demeanour and behaviour, in order to determine what effect that disclosure would have, if made. 

	It is submitted that the better view is that there is no need for doctor D to prove that the harm to the patient, should disclosure be made, was likely on the balance of probabilities. Rather, reasonably foreseeable harm (something which is more likely than a ‘far-fetched or fanciful possibility’) is probably sufficient. It must be said, however, that the English judgments, including Montgomery, are not entirely clear on this point. 

	At the other end of the spectrum, where the risk of harm to the patient’s health brought about by disclosure is merely negligible, the defence will be ruled out. The Queensland case of Di Carlo v Dubois​[51]​ conveniently illustrates. The patient, Mr Di Carlo, was convinced that he had a brain tumour, and a CT scan was arranged to try to eliminate that possibility. He was described as being ‘extremely anxious’ about the prospect of the scan, and about the injection of the contrast agent. As it turned out, Mr Di Carlo had a severe anaphylactic reaction to that injection, and required urgent life-saving treatment. The risk of that reaction had not been disclosed. Evidence was given that, to warn a highly anxious patient of the risks associated with the injection ‘would be likely to make his reaction worse or possibly even precipitate an adverse reaction’. However, that risk of such an adverse physical reaction was described as being ‘negligible’.​[52]​ The defence was expressly ruled out.​[53]​ 

	Hence, in English law, it should be sufficient if the requisite serious harm to patient C was reasonably foreseeable to doctor D (as opposed to being a merely negligible risk). 

Element #2: Disclosure Would have Harmed the Patient’s Health or ‘Best Interests’

This element has two limbs: it’s the patient’s health that matters; and it must be the ‘correct’ type of harm to that health that triggers the defence. Dealing with each in turn:

Preliminary point. In Montgomery, the Supreme Court referred to some harm ‘to the patient’s health’. It may be an obvious preliminary point — but it is the patient’s health with which the defence is concerned. As pointed out in Holmes v Northern Territory of Australia,​[54]​ it cannot be a ground of therapeutic privilege for the doctor to claim that he withheld information from a patient, because of the possible deleterious effects that such disclosure may have on other persons, and how the patient may then behave towards them. That allegation did not pertain to therapeutic privilege at all, said the court.

The possible triggers. Returning to Montgomery’s phrase, the question arises – what particular harm to the ‘health’ of the patient triggers the defence? Montgomery does not address that question.

	There are, in fact, four possible types of harm to the patient’s health, arising from a disclosure of risks information, which could be potential triggers for the privilege to apply: (1) some mental or psychological harm to the patient (falling short of a recognised psychiatric injury); (2) some physical harm to the patient; (3) the patient deciding to forego some treatment being recommended by the doctor; or (4) some combination of these ‘harms’. It is an important legal point, because some types of potential harm to the patient’s health could significantly narrow or widen the defence’s scope. 

	For example, having to prove the risk of physical harm — say, a heart attack because existing cardiac problems will be exacerbated, or some sort of stress-induced dermatitis, or a risk of miscarriage — should the risks information have been disclosed, may be very difficult for a doctor to point to. This would very much narrow the availability of the defence. 

	On the other hand, being able to prove that the patient might forego the recommended treatment, if the risks disclosure had been made, might be much easier to prove — easier, even, than having to prove the prospect of the patient’s suffering serious psychological harm from the disclosure. The risk of foregoing treatment, as a ‘harm’, would widen the ambit of the defence considerably — and indeed, may tend to ‘devour’ the disclosure rule itself. It would conflate with the patient C’s own causal argument, that had the doctor disclosed the risk, C would have declined the treatment on but-for principles. Further, if the doctor could allege that the patient’s decision to forego treatment was a ‘harm’ which invoked the defence, it would reinstate the very paternalism which Montgomery’s primary duty was so keen to jettison from English law. Its success as a therapeutic privilege trigger would mean that the doctor removed the decision-making process from the patient, and was permitted to make up the patient’s mind for him that a certain treatment was the best option — thereby introducing a strong element of ‘medical elitism’.​[55]​ It was for this reason that the Ipp Committee rejected any notion that a decision not to undergo the treatment in question could constitute the ‘harm’ justifying therapeutic privilege: ‘[i]f it did, the patient’s freedom to choose whether or not to undergo the treatment could be seriously compromised by a decision of the practitioner that the patient did not know what was in her or her own best interests.’​[56]​

	Having to prove that the disclosure could give rise to mental or psychological harm appears to be more generally supported in the comparator jurisdictions — although there are plenty of generalist statements by various judges which could potentially encompass all three types!





Type of harm	Why it suffices, on its own ... 	Why it should not be a trigger ... 
Physical harm to the patient, should the risk be disclosed	 the generalist statements of Montgomery (a ‘patient’s health’), Sidaway (‘harmful to the patient’), Chester v Afshar (the patient’s ‘best interests’), and Deriche (‘medically damaging’) do not preclude this type of harm from being a trigger for the defence Lord Woolf expressly referred to ‘physical’ ramifications, in Pearce	 in Sidaway, Lord Scarman (whose judgment was approved in Montgomery) referred solely to ‘psychological detriment’ as a trigger – a definition applied since, in Smith v Eastern Health (same), and Thake v Maurice (‘worry and concern’)
Foregoing treatment which the doctor believes to be in the patient’s best interests	 both Poynter​[57]​ and McAllister​[58]​ expressly approved of this type of harm, when considering the defence in dicta  this is one possible interpretation of Pearce, as to why Mrs Pearce lost her claim (i.e., that, had the risk of stillbirth been disclosed, she would have foregone the recommended option of a natural birth) in Smith v Eastern Health, the court cited the need to balance the ‘possibility that the patient may be left in ignorance of a material risk against the possibility that he may be deterred from accepting beneficial treatment by extended discussion of the risks’​[59]​	 in Montgomery,​[60]​ the Supreme Court expressly rejected the application of therapeutic privilege on the facts, noting that it should not be used to ‘subvert’ the principle that it is the patient’s decision whether to submit to medical treatment – and that the doctor should not prevent the patient’s making a choice about her treatment, even where the patient’s choice (say, to forego a treatment) is one ‘which the doctor considers to be contrary to her best interests’
Psychological harm to the patient, should the risk be disclosed	 this was the clear basis upon which Mrs Pearce lost her claim, that disclosing the risk of stillbirth would have exacerbated her already distressed condition (in Pearce v United Bristol) this was the sole type of harm identified by Lord Scarman in Sidaway this harm is clearly encompassed in all of the generalist descriptors of harm (in Montgomery, Chester, Deriche, and Lord Templeman’s statement in Sidaway)	 there are no contrary indicators to this type of harm in English law, so far as can be ascertained

	Montgomery’s most important contribution to the defence of therapeutic privilege appears to be the rejection of any suggestion that a patient’s foregoing a recommended procedure should qualify as ‘harm’. In that case, Dr McLellan’s evidence was that it was her general policy to withhold information from her patients about the risk of shoulder dystocia arising from vaginal births, because they would otherwise request a Caesarean section as a matter of course — a procedure which itself carried certain gynaeological risks. However, Lords Reed and Kerr noted that therapeutic privilege ‘is not intended to enable doctors to prevent their patients from taking an informed decision. Rather, it is the doctor's responsibility to explain to her patient why she considers that one of the available treatment options is medically preferable to the others, having taken care to ensure that her patient is aware of the considerations for and against each of them.’​[61]​ It is a powerful statement of anti-paternalism. It seems to limit the triggers for the defence, in English law, to either physical harm or mental harm (or both). 

The comparator jurisdictions. It is fair to say that England is not alone in its uncertainty under this element.

	In the jurisdictional ‘home’ of therapeutic privilege, the US courts have shown a similar lack of cohesiveness and consistency. The US Supreme Court referred to the patient’s physical or mental health as being potential triggers in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey;​[62]​ whilst the Fourth Circuit of the US Court of Appeals likewise considered, in Stuart v Camnitz, that therapeutic privilege allows a doctor ‘to decline or at least wait to convey relevant information ... because, in their professional judgment, delivering the information to the patient at a particular time would result in serious psychological or physical harm’.​[63]​ Other cases have also supported this dual trigger.​[64]​ However, some judges consider that Canterbury itself countenanced that only psychological harm, and not physical harm, could trigger the operation of the defence (per the Canadian case of Meyer Estate v Rogers​[65]​) — although a close reading of the relevant passage of Robinson J (‘patients occasionally become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, or complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the patient’) does not, at least to this author, appear to rule out physical harm. A very generalist view of ‘harm’ has also be espoused in US decisions, e.g., the defence applies where disclosing the material risks ‘would not be in the patient’s best medical interests’ (per Cuc Thi Ngo v Queen’s Medical Center​[66]​); would be ‘harmful to the patient’ (per Nacapuy v Dacanay​[67]​); ‘would have a detrimental effect on the patient’ (per Hondroulis v Schuhmacher​[68]​), or ‘would be detrimental to the patient’s wellbeing’ (per Wheeldon v Madison​[69]​). 

	The potential harm of the patient’s foregoing recommended treatment has been the subject of divisive views in the United States. On the one hand, Canterbury v Spence specifically dismissed this type of ‘harm’ from the ambit of the defence, noting that the law simply could not apply ‘the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs’.​[70]​ On the other hand, in Hondroulis v Schuhmacher, the Supreme Court of Louisiana remarked that, ‘[a] doctor should avoid frightening a patient away from a medically necessary course of treatment’,​[71]​ suggesting that the prospect of that would be a ‘detrimental effect’ for the nervous patient. In Logan v Greenwich Hospital Assn too, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the defence can be invoked by a doctor where disclosing the risk ‘might jeopardize a course of therapy’.​[72]​

	In Australian jurisprudence, there are several generalist dicta statements which do not shed much light on the type of harm required, e.g., that the disclosure would be ‘damaging to a patient’,​[73]​ ‘adverse to the patient’s interests’,​[74]​ or would ‘cause the patient harm’.​[75]​ The New South Wales Supreme Court was quite adamant, however, in Haylock v Morris, that information cannot be withheld from a patient by a doctor, ‘due to fears that patients aware of it might not make the best decisions for their own treatment and care’.​[76]​ Earlier, in F v R, King CJ opined that the defence applies where ‘the patient’ health, physical or mental’, could be harmed by risk disclosure​[77]​ — and the risk of ‘hysterical blindness’ in Battersby v Tottman​[78]​ (considered shortly) was one such example. Notably, the Ipp Committee also approved of this dual trigger of therapeutic privilege.​[79]​ In Di Carlo v Dubois,​[80]​ where the patient had an allergic reaction to a contrast agent, the Queensland Court of Appeal acknowledged that the prospect of physical harm could trigger the defence of therapeutic privilege (especially when one of the experts noted that he was not in the practice of giving any warning of an allergic reaction, because of the possibility that anxiety thereby produced might cause just such an adverse reaction). Ultimately though, on the facts, the defence did not apply.​[81]​

Summary. To conclude, this element is one of the most confused aspects of the defence, not only in England but elsewhere. It appears that, for the purposes of English law, the better view is that either physical or psychological harm may serve as a trigger for therapeutic privilege, but not the prospect of the patient’s refusing a course of treatment recommended by the doctor.
 
Element #3: The Doctor’s Decision Not to Disclose was Reasonable

This final element has four limbs: specific reasons for non-disclosure are required; it must be the ‘right type of patient’ to render the withholding of risks reasonable; patient’s questions probably remove the defence; and the ‘reasonableness’ of the doctor’s opinion needs to be adjudged correctly. 

Preliminary point: the doctor’s reasons. First, specific reasons as to why information about material risks were withheld from that patient will need to be adduced, to have any chance of successfully asserting the defence. The US case of Barcai v Betwee​[82]​ provides a useful illustration. Dr Betwee, the defendant psychiatrist, prescribed an anti-psychotic medication to his patient, Mr Barcai, without informing the patient of the risk of developing neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS) as a side-effect. The patient ultimately died of this complication, and his estate sued Dr Betwee. An attempt to rely upon the defence, on the basis of testimony that ‘he never tells any of his patients about the risk of developing NMS’, was rejected by the Supreme Court of Hawaii. A ‘generic statement’ of this type would not be sufficient to raise the defence, ‘because the therapeutic privilege exception is a factual issue specific to a particular patient.’​[83]​ At the very least, the doctor must give evidence of the ‘specific considerations in the individual patient’s case’ which the doctor referred to, in order to withhold risks information from the patient​[84]​ (which did not occur in this case). 

	Undoubtedly, a similar threshold requirement would apply in England, should a defendant doctor wish to assert the defence. That point was made in Montgomery too, where Dr McLellan stated that ‘her practice was not to spend a lot of time, or indeed any time at all, discussing potential risks of shoulder dystocia’, given that the risk of serious damage to the baby was ‘very small’​[85]​ — such generalist notions could not support the application of the defence in English law either. The relevant GMC Guidance​[86]​ are fully alive to this, and exhort a doctor to keep detailed notes as to why the disclosure of material risks did not occur in any given case.

	This then leads to the crux of this element — what attributes of the patient will justify a plea of therapeutic privilege? Clearly, a patient showing anxiety, distress or concern, about a proposed procedure is not enough — Montgomery establishes that. Nor is the view that disclosing risks information would undermine the patient’s confidence (per Deriche v Ealing Hospital NHS Trust​[87]​). Query whether Pearce v United Bristol​[88]​ would be decided in the same way today, on the therapeutic privilege point, if Mrs Pearce merely presented as a distressed expectant mother, who was concerned about her baby’s delivery being overdue. Montgomery gives no further clue about the type of patient to whom the defence will apply. Hence, for this question, we must delve into comparative jurisprudence, particularly that from Australia. 

The specific attributes of the patient – the Rogers v Whitaker majority. The majority in Rogers v Whitaker did specify a particular type of patient, in order for therapeutic privilege to apply: ‘where there is a particular danger that the provision of all relevant information will harm an unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile patient’.​[89]​ Proving that the patient satisfied this three-pronged descriptor has not, however, been easy for doctors in Australia since. The patient in Haylock v Morris, who suffered paraplegia following a hip replacement operation certainly did not; nor did the unfortunate patient in Johnson v Biggs who suffered ‘anaesthesia dolorosa’ arising from a neurectomy, i.e., a sensation of pain from an area not in fact sensitive to pain.​[90]​ The merely ‘inquisitive, persistent and anxious’ patient is not covered by that descriptor (per Chappell v Hart​[91]​), as illustrated by Ms Whitaker herself in the leading case. Even ‘very nervous’ or ‘extremely anxious’ patients do not qualify for the defence, post-Rogers v Whitaker. In Tai v Saxon​[92]​ and in Di Carlo v Dubois,​[93]​ both patients were, respectively, described in those terms. In the former, any argument that risks information could be withheld ‘because of the anxiety that would be induced in the patient is not sustainable’. In the latter, disclosure about the risks of an allergic reaction to the contrast dye was also required (but causation failed). In Sheppard v Swan,​[94]​ the Western Australian Full Court said that a patient who has ‘significant maternal vulnerability as a result of the pain and distress being experienced [during labour] with a likely adverse impact on decision making skills’ falls short of triggering any therapeutic privilege defence too. 

	Indeed, if the particular patient in Dunning v Scheibner​[95]​ did not fall within this category of patient (and the New South Wales Supreme Court held that she did not), it is difficult to imagine who would. Ms Dunning, a lady in her thirties, consulted Dr Scheibner, a cosmetic surgeon, to have a series of what were described as ‘bikers tattoos’ (most of which were large, multi-coloured and visible) removed. She was left with ugly hypertrophic scarring on her arms and back, which the court noted to constitute a much greater blemish than the original tattoos. Ms Dunning sued for a failure to warn of the possibility of such scarring. Dr Scheibner responded that she did not warn this patient because of how Ms Dunning presented — demanding, screaming on occasions, very distraught, and threatening suicide unless the tattoo removal was ‘hurried up’. This presentation prompted the cosmetic surgeon to withhold material risk information, and to admit that she proceeded with a more rapid treatment plan ‘very reluctantly’ and ‘against her better judgment’. All this, however, provided ‘no excuse’ (said the court), and a failure to warn was proven: ‘if [the patient] was suicidal, screaming and very distraught, or clearly not listening to the advice she was being given, it was folly to proceed. In such circumstances, the defendant could not have been satisfied that any decision made by the plaintiff to undergo the procedure, was an informed decision.’​[96]​ This patient, who had her case heard two years after Rogers v Whitaker, did appear to fall within the High Court’s three-pronged descriptor — and hence, the decision only serves to emphasise how difficult the defence is to establish.

	A suicidal patient was also in issue in the pre-Rogers v Whitaker South Australian decision of Battersby v Tottman.​[97]​ It is rare instance of a successful application of the defence in Australian law. The defendant psychiatrist, Dr Tottman, failed to warn the patient that taking the drug Melleril in larger-than-recommended doses over a long period of time, in order to control the patient’s serious mental illness, could result in serious and permanent eye damage. The patient was rendered almost blind as a result of the treatment. The evidence was that: the patient was acutely depressed and suicidal; if she declined the drug, an ‘indeterminate close confinement in a mental institution with a high risk of suicide’ was likely;​[98]​ if she was warned of the risk, then hysterical blindness was also a possible outcome for her;​[99]​ and her reaction to any news of treatment was likely to invoke ‘distorted mental processes produced by her mental illness’. The defence of therapeutic privilege succeeded (although only by majority​[100]​). This treatment was, of course, a world away from the elective removal of tattoos in Dunning v Scheibner or the elective eye surgery in Rogers.  The patient was acutely ill. Also, judges will not always assess a troubled patient in the same way. The majority in Battersby described the patient as someone who was ‘likely to react hysterically and irrationally and to refuse treatment not on rational grounds or as a result of calm deliberation’.​[101]​ The dissenting judge, Zelling J, however, did not judge her in that light at all: ‘the patient must be allowed to make her own decisions, whether the doctor thinks she is well enough to do so or not, except in the case of a person who is ... by reason of mental infirmity, unable to consider and weigh the risk inherent in the treatment. Despite the plaintiff’s mental troubles, she was not in that position.’​[102]​

	In any event, on the strength of Australian case law to date, the waiting room of patients in this ‘unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile’ category established by the High Court’s dicta in Rogers v Whitaker consists of a solitary occupant. It seems that it may not be a promising category upon which solely to construct the defence in English law either, post-Montgomery. 

The specific attributes of the patient – Gaudron J.  In her separate judgment in Rogers v Whitaker,​[103]​ Gaudron J described another type of patient — ‘I see no basis for any exception or “therapeutic privilege” which is not based in medical emergency or in considerations of the patient’s ability to receive, understand or properly evaluate the significance of the [risks] information that would ordinarily be required’. 

Some patients who are extremely volatile and disturbed may fall within this description, and hence, to that extent, there is probably some overlap with the type of patient described by the majority in Rogers. Indeed, the majority in Battersby v Tottman (but not Zelling J) would have placed Ms Battersby within in this description, by reason of her severe mental illness. However, a patient exhibiting Dunning v Scheibner-like volatility is not likely to qualify under this category of Gaudron J’s, and nor is a concerned and nervous patient like Mrs Montgomery. One who is capable of understanding the doctor’s information is not likely to be the sort of patient to whom this description of the defence could apply.

	This category of patient, however, may contain some other disadvantaged patients. Disabled patients may fall within this limb, if they lack the capacity to understand, and weigh up, the risks of proposed treatment. So may severely intoxicated patients, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court case of Miller v Rhode Island Hospital showed (‘[i]ntoxication is a condition that courts have found may impair an otherwise competent patient’s capacity to consent or to object to medical treatment’​[104]​).

	Interestingly, however, in Canterbury v Spence, patients who were ‘unconscious, or otherwise incapable of consenting’ lay outside the scope of therapeutic privilege (the latter applying where disclosure was ‘contra-indicated from a medical point of view’).​[105]​ Emergency situations were also excluded from the US doctrine. Those were different exceptions to therapeutic privilege. Along similar lines, in Pauscher v Iowa Methodist Medical Center, scenarios where either ‘a patient is incapable of giving consent by reason of mental disability or infancy’ or ‘an emergency makes it impractical to obtain consent’, were distinguished from therapeutic privilege.​[106]​ Indeed, in Montgomery, Lords Reed and Kerr suggest the same, differentiating ‘where the patient requires treatment urgently but is unconscious or otherwise unable to make a decision’ from the therapeutic privilege exception of where ‘disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health.’​[107]​

	Nevertheless, some aspects of Gaudron J’s description are useful to draw upon, for the purposes of constructing a meaningful application of therapeutic privilege — in order to cover the disturbed, volatile, temporarily-intoxicated, disabled, or other patient who was unable to properly receive and understand the risks information that would otherwise have been disclosed. 

The specific attributes of the patient – Ipp J. The final type of patient that is worth noting, from Australia’s jurisprudence is derived from Ipp J’s dicta description in Tai v Saxon — a patient for whom the proposed treatment ‘is essential for the preservation or prolongation of life, or possibly where ... the quality of his life is of a very low level and would be transformed by obviously warranted treatment.’​[108]​ Perhaps this calls to mind palliative care for a terminally-ill cancer patient, which treatment carries with it some material risks, but for whom such care is necessary to provide, say, merciful pain relief.​[109]​ Indeed, it is presently somewhat unsettled as to whether the defence of necessity can apply to defend D’s negligence (as opposed to an intentional tort such as assault, where the defence can certainly apply​[110]​). For this reason alone, it is probably appropriate to include this type of scenario within the scope of therapeutic privilege in English law. 

Where the patient asks questions. What if the patient asks specific questions about the risk, but the doctor’s view is that disclosing that risk would be harmful to the health of the patient? Can the defence of therapeutic privilege be used to negate the duty to disclose, even in these circumstances?

	That English authority which exists on this point seems emphatic: the patient’s question must be answered truthfully. There is no room for the defence to operate. In Sidaway,​[111]​ Lord Diplock observed that if the patient showed a desire to be fully informed ‘by means of questioning, the doctor would tell him whatever it was the patient wanted to know’. Lord Bridge agreed: ‘when questioned specifically by a patient of apparently sound mind about risks involved in a particular treatment proposed, the doctor’s duty must ... be to answer both truthfully and as fully as the questioner requires.’​[112]​ In Pearce v United Bristol, Lord Woolf MR put it bluntly: ‘if a patient asks a doctor about the risk, then the doctor is required to give an honest answer’​[113]​ (in that case, Mrs Pearce had not asked that relevant question about the risks which could arise if she waited for ‘nature to take its course’). Montgomery strongly endorses this view.​[114]​ The trial judge had found that Mrs Montgomery had not raised questions about the specific risks involved in a vaginal delivery — but failing to ask precisely the right question (i.e., ‘what are the risks of shoulder dystocia occurring during a natural delivery, and what are the comparative risks of having a Caesarian?’) did not preclude a duty-to-disclose from arising under either limb of Montgomery’s new test of disclosure. It is an important point of ratio in Montgomery, that asking the ‘right question’ does not preclude the patient’s ability to raise a successful claim against a doctor for failing to disclose material risks.​[115]​

	Interestingly, Australian judges do not necessarily see the relationship between therapeutic privilege, and a patient’s questions, in the same way as English judges do. Some have indicated that therapeutic privilege can justify an evasive answer to a direct question. In F v R,​[116]​ King CJ observed that the doctor’s duty to act in the patient’s best interests ‘may justify or even require an evasive or less than fully candid answer even to a direct request’. The majority opinion in Rogers v Whitaker also appeared to support that view, in dicta: ‘[s]ubject to the therapeutic privilege, the question would ... require a truthful answer.’​[117]​

	English law is more pro-patient than this — once patient C asks a direct question, about whether a risk may occur as a result of a procedure, an honest and complete answer is required. Indeed, this approach is consistent with Montgomery's second limb of the primary duty-to-disclose: questions illustrate that the risk mattered to that particular patient.

Assessing ‘reasonableness’. Moving to the last limb of this element — it is not sufficient that the doctor himself thought that disclosure of the risk would harm the patient’s health. In English law, that view must have been objectively reasonable. In Montgomery, it was said that, for the defence to apply, the defendant doctor must ‘reasonably consider’ that the risks disclosure would be harmful;​[118]​ while, in Chester v Afshar, Lord Steyn approved of withholding risks information where it is ‘objectively’ in the patient’s best interests.​[119]​

	How, though, is that reasonable view to be measured? Is it to be decided by reference to a body of reasonable medical opinion under a Bolam​[120]​-type assessment? Or is the defence’s application a matter of judicial judgment, much like the Bolitho ‘gloss’​[121]​ which provides that Bolam evidence can be disregarded, in respect of allegedly negligent diagnosis or treatment, if the court perceives it to be illogical, unreasonable or irrational?​[122]​

	Neither Montgomery nor Chester answers this question. In permitting the plea in Pearce v United Bristol,​[123]​ the court did not address the issue either. Other English cases are somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, in Sidaway, Lord Scarman (whose judgment was approved in Montgomery) appeared to endorse a judicial assessment, noting that ‘[o]n ... the defence, medical evidence will, of course, be of great importance’​[124]​ (but not, by implication, determinative). On the other hand, in McCallister v Lewisham and North Southwark HA,​[125]​ Rougier J noted that therapeutic privilege ‘comes within the umbrella of a question of clinical judgment’, that is, a Bolam assessment.

	The position in the comparator jurisdictions tends to show considerable support for a Bolam-type assessment. Like Montgomery, the Australian High Court did not deal with the point in Rogers v Whitaker at all. However, some post-Rogers v Whitaker case law suggests that medical judgment is the appropriate arbiter of whether therapeutic privilege should apply. In O’Keeffe v Rosen,​[126]​ Byrne J held, in dicta, that, ‘[w]hether ... a surgeon should give such a warning to the patient, and what should be the terms of such a warning, are not so much matters of medical judgement, except perhaps in cases where the warning might cause detriment to the plaintiff, the so-called therapeutic privilege.’ Earlier, in F v R,​[127]​ the South Australian court endorsed the Bolam test (‘when the doctor reasonably judges’). In the US too, in Carr v Strode, the Supreme Court of Hawaii suggested that it must be medical expert testimony which determined whether or not the doctor’s withholding of information was reasonable — because that decision ‘would be based on the physician's exercise of his or her professional judgment’.​[128]​ Other US cases have also supported the notion that peer professional expert opinion is the required arbiter of whether or not risks disclosure would be detrimental to the patient.​[129]​ The Supreme Court of Hawaii noted, in Barcai v Betwee, that peer opinion will be necessary, where ‘the particular facts associated with the physician’s rationale for withholding disclosure involve “medical facts”’, beyond the scope of the court’s general knowledge.​[130]​ Recent US academic commentary has noted that the more recent American case law draws a distinction between a patient-centric duty to disclose material risks, and a ‘discretion to limit the scope of disclosure in exceptional circumstances’ which is substantiated by professional opinion.​[131]​

	On the other hand, a contrary argument is that, if therapeutic privilege depends upon assessing the attributes of the patient when he presented to the doctor, then the trial court can form its own impression about that, on the basis of the factual evidence. In Haylock v Morris, Mr Haylock suffered paraplegia following a hip replacement operation and alleged that he was not warned of the risk associated with an epidural anaesthetic. The defence of therapeutic privilege could not apply, said the court, because there was no evidence that Mr Haylock was ‘unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile’. Rather, ‘I formed the impression, albeit from observations of him nearly seven years after the operation, that he was an emotionally mature and reasonable man who could well have been trusted to make a sensible decision about his own treatment.’​[132]​

	Given these diverse arguments, it is suggested that the better view is that a judicial assessment of the doctor’s conduct in withholding risks information will be required, although it is a question upon which Bolam evidence will be relevant (but not determinative). Two points support this approach. 

	First, it would achieve a pleasing symmetry with the way in which English law approaches the duties of diagnosis and treatment — for as mentioned above, the Bolitho ‘gloss’ governs both those areas of medical negligence.  In Bolitho v City and Hackney HA,​[133]​ Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressly limited his test of where Bolam evidence may be disregarded to ‘cases of diagnosis and treatment’. Montgomery now brings the law across diagnosis, treatment and disclosure into line — Bolam is not determinative under any of those doctor’s sub-duties. Hence, why should it be determinative for a defence such as therapeutic privilege? The modern legal landscape countenances against it. 

	Secondly, proposing the court as the final arbiter of therapeutic privilege, and whether or not non-disclosure was reasonable, would bring about symmetry with the primary duty, under which a court must assess whether the risk should have been disclosed because it was significant. Of course, Montgomery discards Bolam evidence as being the sole assessor on that point — as did Rogers v Whitaker almost 25 years earlier. Having ruled out the paternalism of Bolam under the primary duty, the law would be undoing that ‘good’ if it then allowed Bolam to govern the question of whether a doctor could justifiably withhold risks information. However, Bolam will continue to be highly relevant under the primary duty post-Montgomery, if the Australian experience is anything to go by.  In Rogers v Whitaker, the Australian High Court held that, ‘whether the patient has been given all the relevant information to choose between undergoing and not undergoing the treatment’, then ‘[g]enerally speaking, it is not a question, the answer to which depends upon medical standards or practices’;​[134]​ and that, while Bolam evidence would be ‘a useful guide for the courts, it is for the courts to adjudicate on [whether the risk should have been disclosed]’. From this, it may have been predicted that Bolam evidence would play little, if any, part in assessment of the primary duty in the post-Rogers v Whitaker era — but as it has turned out, Bolam evidence has continued to feature significantly. It has been judicially described since as being ‘significant’;​[135]​ of enormous assistance’;​[136]​ ‘a useful guide’;​[137]​ and ‘helpful’,​[138]​ and it has governed some findings that no warning should have been given because the risk was not material in the eyes of peer professional opinion.​[139]​ In Rosenberg v Percival,​[140]​ Gleeson CJ of the High Court of Australia, subsequently explained that Rogers had made it clear that Bolam evidence was not precluded, but what was denied was its conclusiveness. Indeed (and as noted since​[141]​), Gleeson CJ conceded that, in many cases, professional practice/opinion will be the primary, and in some cases it may be the only, basis upon which a court may decide whether or not a risk was material. It is predicted that, in post-Montgomery case law too, Bolam will retain real relevance, when deciding whether a primary duty to disclose was owed, and whether the defence of therapeutic privilege should apply.

	In summary, it is unlikely that a Bolam-type assessment will solely determine the defence of therapeutic privilege post-Montgomery, given (a) the overall shift away from medical paternalism which the UK Supreme Court signified; (b) the support for a judicial assessment of reasonableness which Lord Scarman preferred in Sidaway (which judgment was expressly approved in Montgomery); and (c) the logical inconsistency which would otherwise exist between the method of deciding which risks ought to be disclosed (by the court’s overall assessment of the facts and circumstances) and which risks could be withheld (by what a responsible body of medical opinion holds). However, it is equally as likely that it will retain considerable relevance under therapeutic privilege. 

	Having outlined the three elements of the defence, the last section of this article outlines why the defence of therapeutic privilege has struggled to succeed in the comparator jurisdictions to date — and whether there is any prognosis for a better outcome for this doctor’s defence. 
 
Legal difficulties with Therapeutic Privilege, Post-Rogers v Whitaker: A Comparative Vignette

Given how closely Montgomery has followed Rogers v Whitaker's approach, the policy issues which have arisen for judicial assessment in Australia regarding therapeutic privilege since then contain some important insights for English jurists. This section canvasses the four principal issues. 

The Inherent Inconsistency Between the Subjective Limb and the Defence

The second limb of the Rogers v Whitaker test came to be incorporated within the various Civil Liability Acts in Australia, under the descriptor, the doctor’s ‘reactive duty’. These were various statutes arising out of the Ipp Committee’s review into the reform of Australian negligence law.​[142]​ The reactive duty meant (said Justice Ipp) that the doctor is under a legal obligation to give information about risks to a patient whose needs and circumstances indicate to the doctor (i.e., he knows, or ought to know) that the particular patient would attach significance to the information. Of course, this limb came to be adopted by Lords Kerr and Reed in Montgomery: that a duty-to-disclose arises where ‘the doctor is, or should reasonably be, aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to [the risk]’.​[143]​

	How, though, does this subjective/reactive duty interact with the doctrine of therapeutic privilege, which states that risk information should not be given to the patient, where that information could be harmful to the patient’s health? The answer which has emerged in Australian is: with great difficulty, if at all. Interestingly, the Ipp Committee declined to deal with the issue, stating that, ‘[t]he application of the therapeutic privilege ... to the reactive duty to inform raises difficult questions of policy that the Panel has not had time to consider.’​[144]​

	However, the reality is that it is difficult for the defence to co-exist with the reactive/subjective duty — and, to the extent that they are incompatible, the subjective duty to disclose must prevail. The doctor cannot say, in those circumstances, ‘I did not wish to make an anxious patient more anxious’. Showing anxiety, incessantly questioning about possible negative outcomes, revealing concern about risks, all mean that the risks are, legally-speaking, material and should therefore have been disclosed. The problem is that the defence of therapeutic privilege, if successful, would empty the subjective/reactive duty of any meaningful content. 

	Both Mrs Montgomery and Mrs Whitaker were clearly nervous about the risk of something going wrong with a natural delivery or with her good eye, respectively. They may not have asked the right questions as to what could go wrong, but they were both anxious, nervous patients. In each case, a duty to disclose, under the reactive/subjective limb was required (indeed, in both cases, disclosure was also mandated under the objective limb, but we are more concerned with the second limb here). No Australian case illustrates the problem better than Tai v Saxon​[145]​ (a decision by Ipp J for the Full Court of Western Australia’s Supreme Court, some years before the Ipp review was undertaken). 

	The patient had a hysterectomy, and suffered a fistula due to the defendant surgeon’s accidental perforation of the bowel during the operation. The risk of perforation and resulting fistula were not disclosed. The surgeon gave evidence that he knew that the patient had suffered a history of anxiety and depression, that he had examined her a week before the operation, and that she ‘was a very anxious patient and I felt that to warn her about a remote possibility will just cause more anxiety to her’. In assessing this evidence, Ipp J did not use the term ‘therapeutic privilege’, but that is effectively what the doctor pleaded. The case was assessed under the reactive/subjective limb of Rogers v Whitaker:

The effect of the history of anxiety and depression was that, in all probability, the [patient] would be less able than a more robust person to cope with the embarrassment, discomfort and distress involved in her bodily functions being so disrupted. ... In circumstances ... where the proposed treatment is non-essential, and where it is reasonably possible that the patient might exercise a choice to decline to undergo it, an obligation which a medical practitioner might otherwise have to disclose the attendant risks cannot be avoided on the grounds that disclosure might make an anxious patient more anxious. That is because the very fact that a patient is anxious may induce him or her not to have the treatment (thereby rendering the risk significant in the Rogers v Whitaker sense).​[146]​

In Tai v Saxon, and with the very best of intentions, the doctor did not wish to make the patient more anxious (and possibly forgo a hysterectomy that would have therapeutic benefits for her) by discussing the unpleasant risks of a fistula. Nevertheless, the defence of therapeutic privilege did not protect him.

	Indeed, a similar theme emerges in Montgomery itself. Dr McLellan gave evidence that Mrs Montgomery had presented as being anxious about her ability to deliver her baby naturally, especially after the ultrasound taken at 36 weeks. Dr McLellan ultimately decided against having another ultrasound taken at 38 weeks, given Mrs Montgomery’s anxiety about the size of the baby.​[147]​ In those circumstances, she could not withhold the information about the risk of shoulder dystocia from Mrs Montgomery, said the Supreme Court. Rather, that ‘illustrate[d] clearly the need for Mrs Montgomery to be advised of the possibility, because of her particular circumstances, of shoulder dystocia’.​[148]​ The defence could not withstand the obligations cast upon the doctor under the subjective/reactive limb. 





A claim of therapeutic privilege can expose a doctor, at least theoretically, to a conflict-of-interest allegation. Again, the judgment of Ipp J in Tai v Saxon​[149]​ is noteworthy:

By withholding information as to the risk, the [doctor] influenced the [patient] to undergo non-essential treatment from which he benefited financially. In making this observation I do not intend to cast any aspersions on the [doctor]; the issue of conflict of interest was not part of the case ... [but the issue] emphasise[s] the implications involved in medical practitioners deliberately omitting to disclose risks to patients to whom they have recommended medical treatment to be undertaken by themselves.​[150]​

Hence, even if the evidence does not point to the existence of a conflict, the mere fact that it has been judicially mentioned as a possibility is no doubt a further reason as to why many doctors would be reluctant, indeed uncomfortable, about seeking to rely upon the defence in Australia.

Patient Autonomy Versus the Doctor’s Benevolence 

In Stuart v Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit of the US Court of Appeal reiterated, in 2014, that the therapeutic privilege defence ‘protects the health of particularly vulnerable or fragile patients, and permits the physician to uphold his ethical obligations of benevolence.’​[151]​  The doctor’s compassion for the patient, which underpins the attempt to rely on therapeutic privilege — that a doctor will seek to spare a nervous and anxious patient even more distress — was apparent too in Battersby v Tottman, where Jacobs J noted that ‘[i]n a case of such acute difficulty, the law should not distrust the judgment of a competent and compassionate medical practitioner’.​[152]​ In Montgomery too, Dr McLellan was concerned that, if she mentioned the risk of shoulder dystocia, then ‘everyone would ask for a caesarean section, and it’s not in the maternal interests for women to have caesarian sections’.​[153]​

	However, the compassionate role of a doctor has given way to the tide of patient autonomy that has swept the corridors of English appellate courts. In Chester v Afshar, Lord Bingham stated that the duty to disclose risks was ‘to enable adult patients of sound mind to make for themselves decisions immediately affecting their own lives and bodies’,​[154]​ and Lord Steyn remarked that, ‘[i]n modern law, medical paternalism no longer rules’.​[155]​ The rationale for that case, as Cranston J pointed out in Birch v UCL Hosp NHS Foundation Trust,​[156]​ was ‘patient autonomy, and respect for the reality that it is the patient who must bear any consequences if a risk transforms itself into a reality.’ That ethos was very much at the heart of Montgomery too — as subsequently pointed out (see, e.g., A v East Kent Hosp University NHS Foundation Trust​[157]​). Lords Reed and Kerr reminded the legal and medical professions that, ‘[a]n adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken.’​[158]​  None of this is readily consistent with a defence which permits material risks to be withheld if a doctor considers that their disclosure would be harmful to the patient. The ‘duty of benevolence’ which the US Court of Appeal writes of in Stuart v Camnitz is not accorded much tangible recognition in modern English case law. 

	On a related point,​[159]​ if a doctor, uncertain of his legal position as to whether therapeutic privilege would ‘come to his rescue’, discloses risks information to a patient, foreseeing that such information will harm that patient — and it does — could that doctor be liable, in negligence, for the harm so caused?  This sort of query is a direct corollary of English law’s unfortunate lack of articulation about the defence.  However, in this author’s opinion, no action for negligence against the doctor would lie. Provided that the risk was indeed a material one, it would fall within the scope of the doctor’s 'Montgomery obligation' to disclose; and breach would be very difficult to prove, surely, where the Bolam professional opinion called in support of the doctor’s act of disclosure would be equally as uncertain of the bounds of the privilege as the defendant himself.  In such circumstances, it is very unlikely that a court would consider that Bolam evidence to be irrational, or irresponsible, as that test has come to be determined since Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment in Bolitho.​[160]​  Nevertheless, the query does bring into sharp focus the need for English law to assist the medical profession better, by explaining when the defence applies to protect the doctor’s compassionate reticence. 

Other Avenues for Dealing with the Nervous Patient

Disclosure of risks information to a close relative of the patient was cited in Canterbury v Spence as being an avenue which may be available to the doctor,​[161]​ instead of having to rely upon the defence of therapeutic privilege (an option which has drawn more recent support in that jurisdiction too​[162]​).





Therapeutic privilege has been called an ‘exceptional’ defence in both English​[165]​ and Australian​[166]​ case law. In Montgomery, Lords Kerr and Reed called it ‘a limited exception’.​[167]​ Even in its juridical ‘home’, it has been called ‘rare’.​[168]​ Despite its recognition in dicta, the reality is that there is one clear instance of therapeutic privilege in English law — Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust.​[169]​  Its rarity of application has allowed courts in all three comparator jurisdictions to avoid the tricky problem of articulating why, when, and to whom, the defence of therapeutic privilege should apply.

	Yet, the UK Supreme Court says in Montgomery that the defence still exists. Thus, it cannot be an untenable defence. It must have some province of operation. On the basis of the analysis undertaken in this article, it is suggested that therapeutic privilege applies where the following conditions are met:

The defence applies where:	the disclosure of material risks would foreseeably result in the prospect of serious physical harm or psychological harm (which may fall short of a recognised psychiatric injury) to the patient (and not to others);	D’s decision not to disclose the material risks was reasonable (as adjudged by the court, and where peer professional opinion will be relevant but not solely determinative), having regard to whether: 	the patient could receive, understand and properly evaluate the significance of the risks information that would ordinarily be required under the primary duty – this could preclude any duty-to-disclose from succeeding, where the patient was severely mentally ill, extremely volatile or disturbed, disabled, or temporarily intoxicated (but would not preclude a duty-to-disclose from arising in scenarios where the patient was nervous, anxious, inquisitive, distressed or concerned about the proposed treatment); or	harm to the patient from a failure to treat was imminent, and outweighed any harm threatened to the patient by the risks associated with the proposed treatment.The defence cannot apply where: 	D is unable to provide specific reasons, relevant to that particular patient, as to why the risks information was withheld; 	the patient asks D a specific question about the precise risk which was not disclosed; or 	the only relevant harm to the patient, should the risks information be disclosed, was the patient’s likely decision to forego a course of treatment recommended by D. 

This Table represents, in the author’s view, the optimal definition of the defence of therapeutic privilege, having regard to both the present state of English law post-Montgomery and to the most workable insights derived from comparative jurisprudence. 

	Furthermore, whilst the GMC’s Guidance​[170]​ correctly emphasises the importance of patient autonomy which Montgomery has plainly promulgated, a clearer indication to doctors who are conducting appointments under often pressurised and difficult schedules, as to when the defence could excuse non-disclosure, is urgently required. It is also a question of fairness — if this defence is to persist, then the medical profession surely deserves a better explanation of it that has been judicially provided thus far. 
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